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Abstract—We investigate a type of emerging user-assisted
mobile applications or services, referred to as Dynamic Mobile
Ad-hoc Crowd Service (DMACS), such as collaborative streaming
via smartphones or location privacy protection through a crowd
of smartphone users. Such services are provided and consumed
by users carrying smart mobile devices (e.g., smartphones) who
are in close proximity of each other (e.g., within Bluetooth range).
Users in a DMACS system dynamically arrive and depart over
time, and are divided into multiple possibly overlapping groups
according to radio range constraints. Crucial to the success of
such systems is a mechanism that incentivizes users’ participation
and ensures fair trading. In this paper, we design a multi-market,
dynamic double auction mechanism, referred to as M-CHAIN,
and show that it is truthful, feasible, individual-rational, no-
deficit, and computationally efficient. The novelty and significance
of M-CHAIN is that it addresses and solves the fair trading
problem in a multi-group or multi-market dynamic double
auction problem which naturally occurs in a mobile wireless
environment. We demonstrate its efficiency via simulations based
on generated user patterns (stochastic arrivals, random market
clustering of users) and real-world traces.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent advances in smart mobile devices (e.g., smartphones)
have enabled many powerful mobile applications and services
that are not available on desktops or laptops, thanks to these
devices’ embedded sensors (e.g., GPS), increasingly powerful
processors, advanced networking capabilities (e.g., Bluetooth,
Wi-Fi), and fast cellular network access. In this paper we con-
sider a type of emerging user-assisted mobile applications or
services, referred to as Dynamic Mobile Ad-hoc Crowd Service
(DMACS), and focus on designing incentive mechanisms that
are crucial to the success of such services. An example of
DMACS is cooperative streaming [1] (a data sharing service)
in which users cooperatively stream to their phones a high
quality video using their data plans1. Another example is a
Peer-to-Peer based k-anonymity location privacy service [2]–
[4], in which a user can borrow nearby other users’ identity
information to hide herself in a crowd. A local mobile cloud
(e.g., [5], [6]) that relies on a cluster of nearby smartphones
as computation resource providers can also be regarded as a
type of DMACS system. Those services are provided by some
smartphone users and consumed by some other smartphone
users who are in close proximity of each other (e.g., within
Bluetooth or Wi-Fi Direct range of each other) in a physical
1Due to bandwidth limitation and data plan quota, only low quality videos
can be streamed to a single phone through a single user’s data plan.
area (e.g., a coffee shop, a train station, or a sitting area in
a public park). The data communication part of such services
is supported by the ad-hoc networks formed by smartphones.
Furthermore, users dynamically arrive at and depart from the
area over time. We use the term DMACS system to collectively
denote such users, their smartphones, the services, and the
mechanism that incentivizes those users to participate in the
provision and consumption of those services. We expect that
there will be substantial growth of DMACS applications as
smart devices become more powerful and pervasive in our
daily lives.
We emphasize that in a DMACS system, the services are
provided by some users and used by some other users. Since
one cannot expect that users will always voluntarily contribute
their limited resources of their smartphones (e.g., data plan
quota, limited battery power and connection bandwidth) to
support such services, it is crucial to provide incentives (e.g.,
monetary value) for users who contribute their resources, and
in the mean time, those users who want to use such services
should expect to pay a fair price for them. A mechanism (that
consists of a collection of algorithms, e.g., implemented in
an app on smartphones) is needed to enable and facilitate
the matching and transaction between users. For example, an
incentive mechanism can help a user who is seeking a video
streaming service find another user who is willing to offer help
(by providing a certain amount of data downloading capacity),
and they can reach an agreement on a price/payment that is
acceptable and fair to both parties. Thus, it is essential to
design an effective incentive mechanism to ensure the success
of such a system, which is the central research problem studied
in this paper.
In this paper, we design an auction-based incentive mech-
anism for a DMACS system. We first use the following
example to describe the system, and based on which, we give
a brief overview of our auction design. For example, while
sitting in a park, a user might want to watch high-quality
videos with the help from other users who have extra cellular
data capacity to share. Or a user might want to use a k-
anonymity location privacy service which relies on the help
from other users around in the same park. In this scenario,
the user is a service consumer or buyer and those other
users who help her are service providers or sellers. In the
mean time, if there are multiple other buyers also present in
the park and try to purchase the service from those sellers,
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there will be a competition among multiple providers and
consumers. In addition, users can arrive and depart over time,
resulting in dynamic membership of the system, leading to
a challenge in system design. Note that the system can last
a long time interval (e.g., a whole day). We can discretize
this dynamic system by dividing the long time interval into
multiple consecutive time periods (e.g., each being a half-
hour), and study the interaction among users in each period.
Furthermore, those users co-existing in the same area during
a single period might not be within the wireless radio ranges
of all other users. That is, not every two users can directly
communicate with each other, which is a common scenario
due to the limitations of wireless signal strength. Think of
a user as a node in a graph and the radio link between two
users as an edge. We use group to denote a complete graph in
which every two users can communicate between themselves
via their smartphones’ Bluetooth or Wi-Fi Direct. During
each period, there might be multiple overlapping groups. For
example, in Figure 1, there are four groups: Group 1 consists
of users {u1, u2, u3, u7}; Group 2 consists of users {u2, u5};
and Group 3 consists of users {u3, u4, u6, u7}. A user can be
in multiple groups at the same time. For example, in Figure
1, user u2 is in Groups 1 and 2, as u2 can communicate with
u5, u1, u3, u7.
Fig. 1. Multiple overlapping groups during a time period. Each dotted circle
represents the radio range of a user centered at the circle.
Note that a DMACS system cannot be described by the
models in existing work on dynamic double auction (DDA)
(e.g., [7], [8]), as they (to the best of our knowledge) always
assume that users are in the same market or group. The nature
of challenges faced in designing DMACS system calls for
the design of a multi-market auction, which is fundamentally
different from existing single-market auctions. In fact, a direct
application of existing truthful single-market double auctions
(e.g., McAfee auction [9]) to each individual market (out of
several overlapping markets) cannot ensure users’ truthfulness
(which is a basic requirement for an auction). An example
is described in detail in Section II-B3. A pioneering work
by Yang et al. [10] applies double auction mechanism to
assist k-anonymity location privacy service, but [10] only
studies single period and single-market auction mechanisms.
In addition, a DMACS system is different from existing
models on crowdsourcing to smartphones (e.g., [11], [12]) in
that they consider the scenario where a server (working as
an auctioneer) purchases services (through the Internet) from
smartphone users located in large geographical areas.
In this paper, we design a multi-market, dynamic double
auction (M-DDA) as an incentive mechanism for a DMACS
system. We do not study the specific application services
(e.g., data sharing [1], location privacy protection [4], or local
mobile clouds [5], [6], [13]) that are supported by a DMACS
system. Instead, we focus on the underlying mechanisms that
ensure the success of a DMACS system through incentivizing
and facilitating users to collaboratively provide and benefit
from those services. Our auction design consists of a collection
of computationally efficient algorithms, which we implement
in a mobile app on Android platform2, referred to as MobiAuc,
working as an auctioneer. Note that the Bluetooth Low Energy
(BLE) on Android Lollipop allows the MobiAuc on a user’s
smartphone to broadcast messages (in peripheral mode) and
scan for other phones’ BLE advertisements even when the
smartphone is in standby mode, with very low power con-
sumption [14], [15].
We now utilize the scenario shown in Figure 2 to put
our incentive mechanism in a practical context. As shown in
the figure, the MobiAuc apps installed on those smartphones
(carried by users) compute bids/asks, and communicate those
bids/asks with each other through beaconing via BLE, a
process similar to the flooding of link state information in
a link-state routing protocol. Those apps also communicate
with backend servers in cloud for other system services such
as transaction auditing, etc. The auction algorithms run by the
MobiAuc apps play a central role in this system. This paper
focuses on the design of those algorithms.
Fig. 2. Example scenario of M-DDA for DMACS. MobiAuc apps (im-
plementing M-DDA) on smartphones select users for trade, i.e., the provi-
sion/consumption of DMACS services such as data sharing, location privacy,
etc. M-DDA takes place only in the ad-hoc network formed by users. In
addition, MobiAuc apps also communicate with backend servers for other
system services such as auditing.
We make the following important contributions.
• We design an auction-based incentive mechanism for the
emerging user-assisted mobile crowd services, enabled
by the latest smartphone technology. This mechanism
includes an effective auction design with key components
such as a well-defined single-period matching rule (re-
ferred to as Virtual Market matching rule), and group
matching algorithm, etc. Our auction design satisfies
2Our preliminary implementation is done on Android Lollipop, which
supports Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) peripheral mode. It can also be
implemented on iOS platform which has iBeacon capability. BLE can transmit
to a range of up to 50 meters which is sufficient for the services we are
interested in.
desired properties of an effective dynamic auction, i.e.,
it is truthful (i.e., no user can benefit from cheating
about her true valuation of the service, arrival time,
group membership, etc.), feasible, individual-rational, no-
deficit, and computationally efficient.
• A main novelty of our auction design is that it addresses
the overlapping multi-group or multi-market nature of a
DMACS system (i.e., multiple overlapping groups co-
existing in a time period). The multi-group characteristic
(inherent in mobile wireless environment) distinguishes
our auction from existing dynamic double auction designs
(which assume that users are in the same auction market).
Note that a direct application of existing truthful single-
market double auctions (e.g., McAfee auction [9]) to each
individual market (out of several overlapping markets)
cannot ensure users’ truthfulness.
• Our extensive simulations based on generated user pat-
terns (stochastic arrivals, random grouping and clustering
of users) and real-world traces demonstrate that our auc-
tion algorithms achieve good system efficiency. We also
show that even in an environment of multiple overlapping
groups, our design can achieve an efficiency level that is
comparable to that of a truthful auction in a single-group
environment, if each user can be in a moderate number
of randomly chosen groups simultaneously.
• Furthermore, our evaluation shows that the price of
truthfulness guarantee (i.e., efficiency loss of a truthful
auction design when compared against a non-truthful
online random greedy algorithm) can be large. This result
is consistent with the impossibility result by Myerson
and Satterthwaite [16], and our results further indicate
a high price we need to pay in order to have guaranteed
truthfulness in a multi-market dynamic double auction.
The rest of the paper is organizes as follows. In Section II,
we present our system model. In Section III we describe our
proposed auction mechanism. We evaluate our auction design
in Section IV. Related work is given in Section V, and the
paper concludes in Section VI.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A. Preliminaries
A dynamic, mobile ad-hoc crowd service (DMACS) system
can be described as a dynamic system discretized in a sequence
of time periods T = 1, 2, 3, ..., indexed by t. Let ai denote user
ui’s arrival time, and di the departure time. We assume a user’s
stay duration in the system (di−ai, referred to as patience) is
bounded by a constant K (referred to as maximum patience),
that is, di ≤ ai + K, ∀i. Consider those users present in the
system in a particular period t. We can think of a user as a
node in an undirected graph at t. If two users are within each
other’s wireless radio range, then there exists an edge between
them in the graph. The graph of those users can possibly be
partitioned into several connected components. A connected
component can be a complete graph by itself, referred to as a
group. Or it might not be a complete graph by itself (i.e., there
exist at least two users who do not have a direct edge between
themselves), and such a connected component is essentially a
cluster of multiple overlapping groups (or maximal cliques).
Figure 1 shows such an example.
If a user is honest about which group(s) she is in, then her
group membership information is only a result of her device’s
radio transmission range. However, a user might want to lie
about her group membership in order to gain advantage in
service trading (if there is no mechanism in place to ensure
truthfulness from users). A user’s cheating behavior will be
discussed later. Let vector G(t) = 〈g1(t), g2(t), ..., g`(t)〉
denote the set of all groups existing at time t (where `
is the number of groups at t). Let binary vector Gi(t) =
〈g1i (t), g2i (t), ..., g`i (t)〉 indicate the groups where user ui is
in at time t. That is, gji (t) = 1 means user ui is in group
j at time t; gji (t) = 0 otherwise. Let Gi(ai, di) denote the
vector of groups where user ui is in during her life time in
the system, i.e., Gi(ai, di) = 〈Gi(ai), Gi(ai+1), ..., Gi(di)〉.
Users who purchase a mobile service are referred to as
buyers, whereas users who offer the mobile service are referred
to as sellers. For ease of presentation, we introduce our model
for homogeneous service environment where the levels of the
qualities of services offered by all sellers are the same. Our
model and algorithms are also applicable to heterogeneous
service environment, as discussed in Section III-B2. A buyer
can do a transaction (i.e., receiving service from) with only one
seller in a period t, and vice versa. When a pair of buyer-seller
is chosen for trading, the amount of service traded between
the pair of buyer-seller is identical to that of any other buyer-
seller pair. The payment offered by a buyer is referred to as
bid, and the price asked by a seller is referred to as ask. Let
B(t) and S(t) denote respectively the set of buyers and the set
of sellers who arrive in period t. Let B(t) and S(t) denote
respectively the set of active buyers and sellers in period t
(note that a user is regarded as active if she satisfies some
requirements, which will be discussed later). Let B(t) ∈ Rm>0
and S(t) ∈ Rn≥0 denote the set of active bids and active asks
in period t, where m ≥ 0 and n ≥ 0 denotes respectively the
number of bids and asks. We use ui to represent a user (who
can be a buyer or a seller). We use ubi to explicitly represent
a buyer when necessary, and bi denotes her bid. Similarly, usj
represents a seller when necessary, and sj represents her ask.
Note that ai = t, ∀ubi ∈ B(t), and aj = t,∀usj ∈ S(t). Let
wi ∈ [0,+∞) denote a user’s true valuation of the mobile
service; wi = bi for buyer ubi ; wj = sj for seller u
s
j . A user’s
true type is specified by
θi = (Gi(ai, di), wi) (1)
Buyer ubi ’s true type is θi = (Gi(ai, di), bi). Seller u
s
j’s true
type is θj = (Gj(aj , dj), sj).
1) System requirements: We model a DMACS system as
a type of double auction [9], and assume that there is an
auctioneer that determines which buyers and sellers will be
selected for trade or service transaction. We want to emphasize
that the auctioneer in our system is not a real person or a
central entity physically located in some place in our system.
Instead, the auctioneer refers to a collection of identical apps,
e.g., the MobiAuc, that run our auction algorithms and reside
in users’ smartphones. Since all those auctioneer apps work
on the same information of the whole system and they use the
same auction algorithms, they will produce the same auction
result. This is similar to a link-state routing protocol (e.g.,
OSPF) that resides in each router in a network and runs
the same algorithm on the same link-state information of the
network. We now explain the system setting from an auction
perspective, and leave a formal description of our auction
design in later sections.
The auctioneer app in each phone periodically broadcasts
beacons (e.g., via BLE peripheral mode [17]) that contains the
phone owner’s type information, and receives beacons from
other phones. A user is given the option to enter in her app
her information such as ask or bid, or she can delay beacon
broadcast to change her arrival time in the system.
Once a user joins the system, the user’s app broadcasts her
value, arrival and departure time to other users. Her app also
broadcasts the list of other users that it can receive. Once
her app receives other users’ broadcast lists, her app knows
which group(s) she is in (unified naming of group IDs can be
easily done with a few more negotiation beacons). Note that
during a single-period auction (to be discussed later), before
the auctioneer has determined who will be the winning buyers
and sellers, a user can broadcast her information repeatedly,
but her information in those messages should be consistent.
For example, the user cannot say her ask is $2 in one message
and change it to $3 in later message(s). This restriction is
necessary to prevent a user from changing her type based
on the received types of other users. The consistency of
a user’s type information in her messages can be easily
verified by examining whether the secure hash (e.g., SHA-2)
of her type information (attached to each beacon message) is
consistent across her messages. Besides broadcasting its own
information, an auctioneer app also re-broadcasts periodically
the information it has received from other users. Note that a
message cannot be falsified or altered, which can be easily
guaranteed by secure hash and public-key encryption for
strong identity purpose. This beacon relaying is necessary to
allow all apps in a cluster to have an unified view of the
cluster. The group membership information of a user during
her stay in the system can be easily determined and updated
by her auctioneer app by reading received messages from
other smartphones. A user does not need to get involved in
this group membership determination process, unless the user
wants to cheat about her group membership.
2) Cheating, reported type, and utility: We assume that a
user may want to cheat about her type to gain benefit. For
example, a buyer might want to report a lower bid than the
amount that she actually can pay, in order to pay less for the
same service. Below is a summary of user cheating behaviors.
1) A user can report an arrival time later than its true
arrival time (by delaying her broadcast beacons); but she
cannot report an earlier arrival time (due to radio range
constraint). This behavior is also considered in [7], [8].
2) A user ui can report an earlier or later departure time
than di, once she arrives in the system.
3) A user ui can report a lower or higher value than wi.
4) A user ui can report that she is in a fewer number of
groups than she is actually in, but she cannot report that
she is in more groups. For example, in Figure 1, u3
can broadcast that she can only receive beacons from
u4, u6 and u7, which means u3 reports that she is only
in Group 3, even though she is actually also in Group 1.
Even though u1 and u2 can hear u3, but they choose to
believe u3’s report as it is possible that u3 simply just
has a bad radio receiver. However, a user cannot report
that she is in more groups, as it can be easily detected by
other users through cross-checking their received reports
(assuming there is no collusion). In addition, once a user
is selected as a winner, she should fulfill her promise
such as giving a payment to the auctioneer or providing
service to a buyer, thus, reporting a group where she is
not actually in can be easily detected.
Let aˆi and dˆi denote respectively the reported arrival time
and departure time of user ui. Let bˆi denote the reported bid of
buyer ubi ; and sˆj the reported ask of seller u
s
j . Let Gˆi(aˆi, dˆi)
denote ui’s reported group. Then, ui’s reported type is denoted
by
θˆi = (Gˆi(aˆi, dˆi), wˆi), (2)
where wˆi can be bˆi (if ui is a buyer) or sˆi (if ui is a seller).
The auctioneer chooses a set of winning buyers and a set of
winning sellers, and decides the payment that those winning
buyers should pay to the auctioneer and the payment that those
winning sellers will receive from the auctioneer. Let pi denote
the payment for user ui. As in [7], [8], [10], we model risk-
neutral agents with quasi-linear utility. Buyer ubi ’s utility is
given by U(ubi ) = bi − pi if she is selected as a winner;
U(ubi ) = 0 otherwise. Seller u
s
j’s utility is given by U(u
s
j) =
pj − sj if she is selected as a winner; U(usj) = 0 otherwise.
B. Multi-market dynamic double auction
We model the incentive mechanism of a DMACS system
as a dynamic double auction for a collection of multiple
overlapping markets or groups (e.g., there are 3 groups in
Figure 1). We call such a model Multi-market DDA or M-
DDA. To the best of our knowledge, existing dynamic double
auctions (e.g., [7], [8]) only consider a single market (i.e.,
all buyers and sellers that are present in a time period join
the same auction market). An M-DDA consists of a sequence
correlated auctions, each taking place in a single period. A
single-period or single-round auction is a direct-revelation
double auction (e.g., [9], [10]) in which a user reports to the
auctioneer only a single direct claim about its type θˆi. The
auction is dynamic as users join or leave the system over time.
In this paper, we introduce a design of M-DDA, referred to
as M-CHAIN auction. M-CHAIN is built on top of the single-
market CHAIN framework proposed in [7]. Note that due to
the nature of multi-group setup in our system, the algorithms
discussed in [7] may not be applicable to our system. At the
heart of our M-CHAIN mechanism is a well-defined single-
period matching rule, referred to as Virtual Market (VM)
matching rule, which utilizes McAfee single-round auction
[9] as a subroutine. A problem instance that is solved by M-
CHAIN can be formalized as a tuple
〈B(T ),S(T ),G(T ), T,K〉. (3)
Note that T is a sequence of periods. With a slight abuse of
notation, we also let T represent the maximum period of the
system. M-CHAIN differs from the ones in [10] in that [10]
does not deal with a multi-market situation, nor a dynamic
system. Next we give a brief review of CHAIN, McAfee
Auction [9], and some other techniques utilized in our M-
CHAIN design.
1) A brief review of CHAIN framework: CHAIN [7] is an
algorithmic framework that can be used to construct truthful
dynamic double auctions through the plug-ins of various
modules, with an underlying assumption that all users are in
a common market. Its basic algorithmic flow is as follows.
During each period t, the auctioneer first decides whether to
accept a newly arrived user ui by generating an admission
price qi(t) for the user. If ui is a buyer and bˆi ≥ qi(t), then ui
is admitted; if ui is a seller and sˆi ≤ qi(t), then ui is admitted.
Then the auctioneer form a set of active buyers and a set of
active sellers for time t, which consist of newly accepted users
and those who were not chosen by the auctioneer as winners
in period t−1 but are allowed by the auctioneer to stay in the
system till time t (as they satisfy some requirements, discussed
below). Then, the auctioneer runs a single-period matching
rule to choose a set of buyers and a set of sellers as winners
in period t, out of all active buyers or sellers in period t.
The auctioneer also constructs a Strong-No-Trade (SNT) set
of users for period t (denoted by SNT (t)), and only those
losing user who are in SNT (t) will be survivors (i.e., active
at t+1). After a single-period auction at time t, a user can be
in one of the three states: winning, survived (i.e., in SNT (t)),
or priced-out.
The three key components of CHAIN are: a well-defined
single-period matching rule, a valid SNT set construction for
each period t, and a procedure to calculate the admission price
qi(t). A single-period matching rule is an auction algorithm
that selects winning buyers and sellers out of active buyers
and sellers, and determines the payment that those winning
buyers should pay to the auctioneer and the payment that those
winning sellers will receive from the auctioneer. A SNT set
construction for a matching rule in time t is valid if the users in
the set satisfies the following three requirements (we take user
ui as an example): (1) user ui won’t be chosen for trade no
matter what value wˆi she reports as long as wˆi ∈ R and other
users’ reported values remain unchanged; (2) while dˆi > t,
user ui cannot manipulate θˆi to affect whether herself is chosen
into the SNT set, nor can she affect whether other users will
be put into the SNT set. For a formal definition of a valid
SNT, see [7]. Another requirement of CHAIN is that all users’s
patiences, should be bounded by a constant K (the maximum
patience). A formal definition of a single-period well-defined
matching rule is given in [7] and re-stated below.
Theorem 1: [7] Single-period well-defined matching rule:
A single-period matching rule is well-defined if it satisfies
the following properties: truthfulness, no-deficit, individual-
rationality, and feasibility.
The above four properties are explained below:
• Truthfulness, no user can benefit from cheating about her
true type θi (i.e., θˆi 6= θi).
• Individual rationality, a buyer or seller always receives
a nonnegative utility by participating in the auction and
reporting her true type.
• No-deficit or budget balance, the total payment collected
from the winning buyers is at least as large as the total
payment paid to the winning sellers.
• Feasibility, each user’s service transaction can take place
within her reported life time in the system if she is
selected as a winning buyer or seller.
Note that we differentiate an auction’s system efficiency
from its computation efficiency. System efficiency represents
the quality of an auction’s outcome when it is compared
against the outcome of an optimal offline algorithm assuming
all users are truthful. Its formal definition is given in Section
IV. The impossibility result by Myerson and Satterthwaite [16]
says that it is impossible to simultaneously achieve maximum
system efficiency, truthfulness, individual rationality, and no-
deficit. Computation efficiency represents the time complexity
of an auction algorithm.
Bredin et al. [7] have shown that an online or dynamic
double auction (DDA) algorithm constructed from CHAIN
framework has all desired properties of an auction.
Lemma 1: [7] A dynamic double auction (DDA) CHAIN
algorithm is truthful, no-deficit, individual-rational, and feasi-
ble, when it uses a well-defined single-period matching rule, a
valid SNT construction, and users’ patiences are bounded by
a constant K.
A problem instance for a CHAIN-based auction algorithm
can be described as 〈B(T ),S(T ), g0(T ), T,K〉, where g0(T )
represents the only group that exists in each period. Note that
CHAIN’s problem instance construction is a special case of
that for our proposed M-CHAIN, as G(T ) in M-CHAIN’s
problem instance (3) indicates that in M-CHAIN, there can
exist multiple groups in each period.
In addition, our auction design uses McAfee auction [9] as
a subroutine. We briefly review this auction as follows. Since
McAfee auction algorithm deals with single period only, we
ignore the time notation t here.
2) McAfee auction algorithm [9]: If min(|B|, |S|) < 2,
then there is no trade. Otherwise, place two dummy bids
(and asks) with values ∞ and 0 into B and S. Sort those
bids and asks in descending and ascending order, respectively,
with ties broken arbitrarily. Let b(0) ≥ b(1) ≥ ... ≥ b(m) and
s(0) ≤ s(1) ≤ ... ≤ s(n) after the sorting. Note that (b(0), s(0))
denotes dummy pair (∞, 0) and (b(m), s(n)) denotes dummy
pair (0,∞). Let k ≥ 0 index the last pair of bids and
asks such that b(k) ≥ s(k) (hence b(k+1) < s(k+1)). Let
p(k+1) = (b(k+1) + s(k+1))/2. When k ≥ 1, consider the
following two cases: Case I. If price b(k) ≥ p(k+1) and
s(k) ≤ p(k+1) then the first k bids and asks trade and payment
p(k+1) is collected from each winning buyer and made to each
winning seller. Case II. Otherwise, the first k − 1 bids and
asks trade; b(k) is collected from each winning buyer; s(k) is
made to each winning seller.
3) Single-market truthful auction cannot ensure truthful-
ness in multi-market scenarios: We now use an example to
illustrate that directly applying McAfee auction (a single-
market auction) in each individual group or market can-
not ensure truthfulness from users in a multi-market sce-
nario. Consider four buyers {ub1, ub2, ub3, ub4} and five sellers
{us1, us2, us3, us4, us5}. their true bids and true asks are {b1 =
$12, b2 = $10, b3 = $2, b4 = $1} and {s1 = $1, s2 =
$1, s3 = $4, s4 = $3, s5 = $5}. There are two groups in the
system: Group 1 and Group 2. A user belongs to either one
of the two groups, or belongs to both groups. The true group
membership of those users is illustrated in Figure 3. Suppose
that the auction in Group 1 is conducted first, and it is followed
by the auction in Group 2. Both groups conduct McAfee
auction. If all users report their true group membership and
true bids/asks, then b1 and s1 will be selected as winners
during Group 1’s auction (ub1’s payment is $10 and u
s
1 receives
$4) , and b2 and s2 will be selected as winners during Group
2’s auction (ub2’s payment is $2.5 and u
s
2 receives $2.5). Now
consider that buyer ub1 cheats by saying that she is not in Group
1 (i.e., she is not aware of the existence of user us3), illustrated
in Figure 4. Then, during Group 1’s auction (conducted first),
ub2 and u
s
1 are winners. During Group 2’s auction, u
b
1 and u
s
2
are winners, and ub1’s payment is $2.5, which is less than $10
that she has to pay (when she does not cheat).
Fig. 3. The true group member-
ship of those users (represented
by their bids/asks).
Fig. 4. The broadcast message
sent by buyer ub1 does not say
that she can directly communi-
cate with seller us3.
III. TRUTHFUL AUCTION DESIGN FOR DMACS SYSTEM
We present in this section multi-market CHAIN, a truthful
and computationally efficient auction design, as an incentive
mechanism for a DMACS system.
A. M-CHAIN auction
Multi-market CHAIN (M-CHAIN) is displayed in Algo-
rithm 1. At the heart of this auction are a well-defined single-
period matching-rule, referred to as Virtual Market (VM)
matching rule (shown as Algorithm 2), a valid strong no-trade
construction for each period, and a truthful Group Matching
algorithm (shown as Algorithm 3). The strong no-trade set
SNT (t) consists of two sets SNTB(t) and SNTS(t), for
buyers and sellers respectively. We use H(t) ∈ Rh (i.e., the
history in period t) to denote the set of users that were either
priced out or selected (as winners) by the auctioneer at time
t. Here h is the total number of users in H(t).
Algorithm 1 M-CHAIN
Require: 〈B(T ),S(T ),G(T ), T,K〉
1: t← 0
2: while t ≤ T do
3: Active buyer set B(t)← SNTB(t− 1)
Active seller set S(t)← SNTS(t− 1).
4: for each user ui in B(t) and S(t) do
5: Calculate the admission price qi according to (4).
6: If ui is a buyer and bˆi ≥ qi, then add her into B(t).
If ui is a seller and sˆi ≤ qi, then add her into S(t).
7: end for
8: Invoke the single-period matching rule given by Algo-
rithm 2 to select winning buyers and sellers from B(t)
and S(t), and determine their payments.
9: Losing users that are not in SNTB(t) or SNTS(t) will
be priced out and put into history H(t).
10: end while
The admission price calculation (given in [7]) is as follows.
If ui would lose in t′ and ui /∈ SNT (t′),∀t′ ∈ [dˆi−K, aˆi−1],
then qi = ∞ (for buyer) or qi = −∞ (for seller); otherwise,
calculate qi as follows:
qi =
{
maxt′∈[dˆi−K,aˆi−1],i/∈SNT (t′)[pi(t
′),−∞], for buyer
mint′∈[dˆi−K,aˆi−1],i/∈SNT (t′)[pi(t
′),∞], for seller
(4)
where pi(t′) is the payment that a buyer would pay (or a seller
would receive) in period t′ if she would join the auction with
other users in H(t′). Such a payment is determined by the
matching rule given by Algorithm 2. A user ui is admitted if
her patience equals K, or ui ∈ SNT (t′),∀t′ ∈ [dˆi−K, aˆi−1].
1) Virtual market single-period matching rule: The idea
of Virtual Market (VM) matching rule is as follows. The
auctioneer app on each user’s smartphone conducts auction
by pooling all sellers and buyers together into a single virtual
market, without considering their group information. Since all
auctioneer apps have the same knowledge after the message
exchange phase of each period and they run the same auction
algorithms, so they will derive the same auction result. For
example, MobiAuc apps running on users’ smartphones obtain
the same knowledge of the system through message exchanges
via broadcast beaconing and scanning, a process similar to
OSPF’s link-state information flooding. Note that the MobiAuc
app can continuously broadcast and scan via Bluetooth Low
Energy (with very low power consumption), even when a
device (e.g., Nexus 6) is in standby mode. The auctioneer apps
run McAfee auction [9] (described in Section II-B2) for the
virtual market to get a candidate set of winners as candidates,
denoted by sets Bc(t) (buyers) and Sc(t) (sellers), and then
from them, they use Group Matching (Algorithm 3) to select
the sets of final winning buyers and sellers, denoted by BW (t)
and SW (t).
This rule is shown in Algorithm 2. Since we focus on
a single period here, we drop time notation t for ease of
exposition. Recall that S and B denote active seller set and
active buyer set respectively. Assume that there are ` groups
at t. Let G denote the set of all users from all groups.
Algorithm 2 Virtual Market single-period matching rule
Require: B,S,G.
1: G← ⋃∑`
k=1
gk,∀gk ∈ G. (G is a virtual market).
2: Run McAfee auction to select winners, denoted by two
sets: Bc, buyer set; and Sc, seller set. McAfee auction
also determines the payment pmcafeei for each user ui.
3: Run Group Matching algorithm (Algorithm 3) with inputs
Bc and Sc and G, and obtain a set of final winning
buyers BW and a set of final winning sellers SW .
Determine the final payment: for buyer ubi ∈ BW ,
pi = max{pmcafeei , qi}; for seller usj ∈ SW , pj =
min{pmcafeej , qj}, where qi, qj are admission prices.
2) Group matching algorithm: Group Matching Algorithm,
displayed in Algorithm 3, chooses the final winning buyers
and sellers from Bc and Sc. The idea of this algorithm is as
follows. We first build a bipartite graph (V,E) by connecting
a buyer and a seller with an edge if they belong to at least
one common group. Then, use the enumeration algorithm in
[18] to find all maximum matchings in the bipartite graph.
Let M denote the set of all those matchings. If M = 1, we
choose all those vertices (i.e., users) in the unique matching
in M as winners in BW and SW . If M > 1, we first put
all those vertices that are covered by all matchings in M into
BW and SW . Then, sort other vertices in descending order of
node degree to get a sorted list U ′r = (u
′
1, u
′
2, ..., u
′
|U ′r|). We
do the following loop by looking at the nodes one by one in
the sorted list, starting from the first node u′1 (highest degree
node): when looking at u′i, remove those matchings (from
the remaining matchings in M) which do not cover u′i. The
loop stops when having looked at all nodes or M = 1. This
algorithm guarantees that a higher-degree node gets higher
priority of being selected as a final winner. Thus, the dominant
strategy of a user is to report as many groups (where she is
actually in) as possible, i.e., report her true group membership
information. Thus, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 2: With Group Matching algorithm, a user’s domi-
nant strategy is to report her true group membership.
Group Matching algorithm discourages a user from cheating
about her group membership (i.e., reporting fewer groups). An
example is given in Figures 5 and 6, where buyers are u1, u2,
and u3; and sellers are u4 and u5. An edge between a buyer
and a seller indicates that they are in at least one common
group. As shown in Figure 5, if user u2 truthfully reports that
she is in a group with u4 and u5, then she can possibly be
chosen by Group Matching algorithm, as her node degree is
Algorithm 3 Group Matching Algorithm
Require: Bc, Sc, and G (set of all groups).
1: From Bc, Sc, and G, build a bipartite graph (V,E), the
vertex set is partitioned into V = Bc⋃Sc. The edge set
E contains an edge between a seller sc in Sc and a buyer
bc in Bc if and only if there is at least one group to which
they both belong according to their reports.
2: Use the enumerating algorithm in [18] to find all maxi-
mum matchings in this graph.
3: if there is only one maximum matching M , then
4: Let BM and SM respectively denote the sets of matched
buyers and sellers. Set BW ← BM , and SW ← SM .
5: else if there are multiple maximum matchings then
6: Let M = {Mj , j = 1, 2, ...,m} denote the collection
of all those matchings. Note that each matching Mj is
a set of edges, each with end vertices corresponding to
a buyer and a seller.
7: Derive set Munion =
⋃m
j=1Mj .
Bunion = {ubk, if ∃(ubk, usi ) ∈Munion},
Sunion = {usk, if ∃(ubi , usk) ∈Munion}.
8: Derive set Minter =
⋂m
j=1Mj . Let Binter and Sinter
denote the buyers and sellers in Minter respectively.
9: BW ← Binter and SW ← Sinter.
10: B′ ← Bunion \Binter and S′ ← Sunion \ Sinter.
U ′ = B′
⋃
S′
11: Sort all users in U ′ in descending order of node
degree to get U ′r = (u
′
1, u
′
2, ..., u
′
|U ′r|), with ties broken
arbitrarily.
12: for i = 1 to |U ′r| do
13: If |M| = 1, break.
14: for j = 1 to |M| do
15: If |M| = 1, break.
16: Else if u′i /∈Mj , remove Mj from M.
17: end for
18: end for
19: If |M| = 1, add all buyers and sellers in the only
matching in M into sets BW ,SW . If |M| > 1,
arbitrarily choose one matching in M, then add all
buyers and sellers in it into sets BW ,SW .
20: end if
21: return BW ,SW
the same as that of u1 and u3 (note that u1, u2, u3 are in S′).
As shown in Figure 6, if u2 sends a mis-report saying that
she is only in a group with u5, then she will certainly not be
chosen by Group Matching algorithm.
VM matching rule is computationally efficient. Note that
the sorting in McAfee auction (Step 2 of Algorithm 2) takes
polynomial time. Now consider the computationally dominant
parts of Group Matching algorithm (Algorithm 3). The bi-
partite graph formation in Step 1 takes O(|E|) time. The
maximum-matching enumeration takes O(|V ||M|) time with
(|V | = |Bc|+|Sc|). This is because the enumeration algorithm
in [18] takes O(|V |) time per max-matching. Steps 3-10 take
Fig. 5. Users report their true
group membership.
Fig. 6. User u2 reports that she
is not in the same group as u4.
O(|E|2|M|) time. The sorting in Step 11 takes O(|V | log(|V |)
time. The nested loops (from Step 12 to Step 18) take
O(|V ||M|) time. Note that if the graph is sparse and/or small
(which is usually the case), |M| is a small number. Empirical
data from the MIT Reality Mining project [19] indicates that
this is indeed the case in practice (See Section IV-C). Thus this
algorithm is practically efficient. But if the bipartite graph is
dense and large, |M| can be very large. In that case, we use a
truthful polynomial-time heuristic to determine BW and SW .
The basic idea is that we start with the bipartite graph, and
sort all buyer nodes and all seller nodes in descending order of
node degree to get two sorted list U ′B = (u
b
(1), u
b
(2), ..., u
b
(|U ′B |))
(buyers) and U ′S = (u
s
(1), u
s
(2), ..., u
s
(|U ′S |)) (sellers). Out of u
b
(1)
and us(1), choose the one with higher degree (with ties broken
arbitrarily). Suppose that ub(1) is chosen. Then search U
′
S from
the beginning till find the highest-degree seller node us(k) that
is in a common group with ub(1), and then put u
b
(1) and u
s
(k) into
BW and SW respectively, and remove them from the graph
and from their respective lists. If such a us(k) does not exist,
remove ub(1) from U
′
B and the graph. Continue this process till
either U ′B = ∅, or U ′S = ∅, or E = ∅. This heuristic clearly
takes polynomial time. When compared with Algorithm 3, this
heuristic might not return the maximum number of buyer/seller
pairs (hence a performance loss). However, our simulations
show that the difference between it and Algorithm 3 is very
small. This heuristic is truthful, as a higher-degree node gets
higher priority of being selected.
3) Strong no-trade construction: We borrow the SNT con-
struction from [7], shown below.
Definition 1: SNT (t) set is defined as SNT (t) := ∅ if
min(|B(t)|, |S(t)|) ≥ 2; otherwise SNT (t) := B(t)⋃S(t).
This is a valid SNT construction because an empty set is
always a valid SNT construction, and no user will be se-
lected for trade according to the VM matching rule when
min(|B(t)|, |S(t)|) < 2, thus this construction is valid.
4) An example: We now illustrate Algorithms 2 and 3
through the following example. Consider a network topology
with a set of active buyers B = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} and a set of
active sellers S = {a, b, c, d, e} at a particular time period,
as depicted in Figure 7. The candidate selection process
(Step 2 in Algorithm 2) is demonstrated in Figure 8. The
algorithm selects 4 candidate sellers (out of 5) and 4 candidate
buyers (out of 5), by placing all users in a virtual market or
group. Then at the beginning of Algorithm 3, we construct
a bipartite graph (shown in Figure 9) and find its set of all
max matchings M = {M1 = {(a, 3), (b, 1), (c, 4)},M2 =
{(a, 3), (b, 1), (d, 4)},M3 = {(a, 2), (b, 1), (d, 4)},
M4 = {(a, 2), (b, 1), (c, 4)}}. Then in Steps 8 and 9 of
Algorithm 3, we have Minter = {(b, 1)}, BW = {1}, and
SW = {b}. After Steps 10 and 11, the sorted list is U ′r =
(a, 4, 2, 3, c, d). Then the loop during Steps 12 to 18 includes
the following four iterations: Iter-1, M remains unchanged;
Iter-2,M remains unchanged; Iter-3,M = {M3,M4}; Iter-4,
M = {M4}. Finally in Step 19, we have SW = {a, b, c} and
BW = {1, 2, 4} as final winners, as depicted in Figure 10.
Fig. 7. Example set of active
users. Fig. 8. Step 2 of Algorithm 2.
Fig. 9. The bipartite graph at the
beginning of Algorithm 3.
Fig. 10. The final winning
matching set M4 at the end of
Algorithm 3.
B. Truthfulness and computational efficiency of M-CHAIN
We prove that VM matching rule is a well-defined single-
period matching rule. See Appendix for a proof.
Theorem 2: Virtual Market single-period matching rule is
well-defined, i.e., it is truthful, no-deficit, individual-rational,
and feasible.
M-CHAIN satisfies all requirements for an DDA CHAIN
auction. Based on Lemma 1 (Theorem 3 in [7]), we have:
Theorem 3: Multi-market dynamic double-auction
M-CHAIN is truthful, no-deficit, feasible, and individual-
rational.
M-CHAIN auction is computationally efficient, because the
Virtual Market matching rule (the computationally dominant
part of M-CHAIN) is efficient.
1) Variants of M-CHAIN: M-CHAIN can also adopt other
well-defined single-period matching rules designed for a multi-
market system. For example, we have designed a random
ordering multi-market (ROM) rule that puts all groups (in
period t) into a random order, then treats the ordered list
of groups as an instance of a single-group dynamic double
auction. Due to space limitations, we will defer the discussion
of this rule in an extended version of this paper.
2) Heterogeneous services: We next consider heteroge-
neous service where the level of quality of service offered
by sellers is not uniform, e.g., two sellers may offer data
connections with different signal strengths. There might be
many possible design goals for a heterogeneous system. One
practical goal we consider here is to design an auction algo-
rithm that selects a set of buyers and sellers that achieves
the maximum overall quality of service (with ties broken
arbitrarily), subject to the requirement that the algorithm must
be truthful, individually rational, feasible, and no-deficit. We
can slightly modify our M-CHAIN algorithm to achieve this
design goal. Specifically, we can assign a positive weight value
to every edge in the bipartite graph (V,E) in the initial step
of the Group Matching algorithm (Algorithm 3). Those edge
weights can be set proportional to the levels of quality of
service offered by sellers. Then, at Step 6, we compute the sum
of all edge weights in each matching set Mj , j = 1, 2, . . . ,m
and sort those matchings in a descending order according to
their sums of edge weights. If there is only one matching with
maximum sum of edge weights, denoted by Mmax, then let
M = {Mmax} and the algorithm jumps to Step 19; if there
are multiple matchings with the same maximum sum of edge
weights, let Mmax denote the set of those matchings, and
let M = Mmax, and then the algorithm continues at Step
7. This modified algorithm guarantees the truthfulness from
users and ensures the set of finally chosen buyers and sellers
achieves maximum quality of service among all candidate
buyers/sellers.
IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the system efficiency and
the price of truthfulness guarantee of M-CHAIN auction by
simulating users’ patterns based on generated data and a real-
world dataset. Due to space limitations, we focus on allocative
efficiency, a typical efficiency metric.
A. Evaluation metrics
1) Efficiency: We have developed a Python-based simulator
to simulate DMACS systems, each characterized by a tuple
〈B(T ),S(T ),G(T ), T,K〉,
i.e., a problem instance that is solved by M-CHAIN. For each
simulation run of a problem instance, we aggregate the total
value (denoted by VmChain) of all users that are selected
for trade during all time periods. Formally, VmChain =∑
t∈T,ubi∈BW (t),usi∈SW (t)(bi − sj).
For each simulation run, we also calculate the total value
of an offline optimal matching, which is found by solving
the following integer programming problem, based on the
assumption that we know all users’ true types.
max
xij
∑
(ubi ,u
s
j)∈F xij(bi − sj) (5)
s.t. 0 ≤∑i:(ubi ,usj)∈F xij ≤ 1, ∀usj (6)
0 ≤∑j:(ubi ,usj)∈F xij ≤ 1, ∀ubi (7)
xij ∈ {0, 1}, ∀ubi , usj (8)
Set F consists of all pairs of buyer and seller that can appear
in the same period and in the same group.
F = {(ubi , usj) : ai ≤ dj , aj ≤ di,
∃t, k, s.t. ubi ∈ gk(t), usj ∈ gk(t)} (9)
Let Vopt denote the total value derived by solving the integer
programming problem in (5). Then a normalized allocative
efficiency of M-CHAIN solving a DMACS problem instance
is defined as E = VmChain/Vopt. For the rest of the paper, we
will call E efficiency. We run each simulation setting with 5
different random seeds, and calculate their average efficiency
as M-CHAIN’s efficiency in that setting.
2) Price of truthfulness guarantee: We are also interested in
the amount of efficiency loss due to the truthfulness guarantee
of an auction design, referred to as price of truthfulness
guarantee. Recall that Myerson and Satterthwaite [16] shows
that no double auction can simultaneously achieve system
efficiency, truthfulness, individual rationality, and no-deficit.
We investigate the price of truthfulness guarantee of M-
CHAIN by comparing its efficiency level with that of a
random greedy online matching algorithm. The random greedy
algorithm works as follows. In each period t, we first put
all groups into a randomly ordered list. Then we conduct a
single group greedy matching for each group, following the
order of the list. A user that is not selected in any group’s
greedy matching will still stay in the system if her departure
time is later than t. The single group greedy matching (from
[7]) is done by first ordering buyers and sellers into two lists
(as what McAfee auction [9] initially does), then select pairs
of buyers and sellers till the first pair in which the buyer’s
value is no more than the seller’s value. Note that this is
not a truthful algorithm. It would achieve a higher efficiency
level than that of M-CHAIN if all users were truthful. Let
Vg denote the total value of the random greedy algorithm.
We define M-CHAIN’s price of truthfulness guarantee as
LmChain = (Vg − VmChain)/Vopt.
B. Stochastic arrivals and random grouping of users
In each simulation run, users arrive in the system follow-
ing a Poisson arrival process, with mean inter-arrival time
varying between 0.1 and 1.5 time periods. In addition, peers’
maximum patience is K = 6. Each user’s patience is taken
uniformly at random from [0, 6]. For each period t, there are
at most 10 groups, and out of which, a user present in the
system can be in randomly chosen ` groups, with ` ∈ [1, 10].
Each user’s value is taken from a uniform random distribution
with lower and upper bounds of it are 20% less than or
more than its mean, and the mean varies over time following
a Brownian motion. Specifically, in each t, we randomly
increase or decrease the mean by multiplying it with e±γ ,
where γ is a market volatility factor varying from 0.01 to
0.15. The initial mean value for a problem instance is 20. The
total number of users arriving at the system is 10, 000, and
when a new user joins the system, she is equally likely to
be buyer or a seller. The arrival process and market volatility
patten are similar to those in [7], but [7] does not consider
multiple groups. We next present a few typical results from
our extensive simulations.
1) Efficiency varies as a function of arrival rate and market
volatility: Figure 11 compares the cases where each user is
in 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 randomly chosen groups, and all users
in a single group (when γ = 0.01). We observe that M-
CHAIN’s efficiency E increases as a user belongs to a larger
number (denoted by `) of randomly chosen groups. This is
because a cluster of overlapping multiple groups will approach
a single unified group as ` increases, and this figure shows
that when ` = 5, 6, 7, M-CHAIN’s efficiency level is almost
the same as that of a single-market case. We observe similar
pattern in all other volatility levels. Figure 12 shows the impact
of market volatility factor γ on M-CHAIN’s efficiency. We
observe that as market becomes more volatile (i.e., larger γ),
the efficiency becomes lower, which is consistent with our
intuition. In addition, except for the increase at the beginning,
the efficiency decreases in general as the inter-arrival time
increases, because as users join the system less frequently, they
are more likely distributed into separated clusters. The initial
increase in those curves can be explained by our stringent
SNT construction which can eliminate lots of users from the
auction if there is a large number of users in system. Part of
our ongoing research is to develop a formal analysis of this
pattern. In addition, all those curves (in Figure 12) move closer
to each other as inter-arrival time gets larger, because if users
join the system very infrequently, the market volatility won’t
have much impact on the efficiency as there are not many
users in the system.
Fig. 11. Efficiency comparison be-
tween 7 cases when market volatil-
ity γ = 0.01.
Fig. 12. Efficiency comparison. A
user is in 5 randomly chosen groups
(out of 10) in each period.
2) Price of truthfulness guarantee: Figure 13 shows the
price of truthfulness guarantee of M-CHAIN when compared
with random greedy online matching algorithm (given that
γ = 0.05). We observe (across all simulation settings) that
the efficiency loss can be large in order to guarantee the truth-
fulness from users, which is consistent with the impossibility
result by Myerson and Satterthwaite [16] that suggests there
is a tradeoff between truthfulness and efficiency. Our results
here further indicate a high price we need to pay for guaranteed
truthfulness in a multi-market dynamic double auction setting.
C. M-CHAIN in a highly dynamic and sparse system
We now evaluate M-CHAIN based on the user patterns
(including user arrival/departure processes and groupings)
Fig. 13. Price of truthfulness guarantee when γ = 0.05.
derived from a real-world dataset from the MIT Reality Mining
project [19]. The information in the dataset includes call logs,
Bluetooth devices in proximity, etc., that were collected from
100 users (from August 2004 to July 2005) who carried Nokia
6600 smartphones. We are only interested in the device prox-
imity information, i.e., the records of each user’s neighbors
that were detected via every 5-min Bluetooth scan through
their smartphones. We did not use the data of July 2005,
as that month contains less than 100 scan records, whereas
other months contain more than thousands of records. We first
process the raw data and derive group information per scan per
day. A cluster of groups in a DMACS system corresponds to
a proximity network [19] (i.e., a network of users formed by
the Bluetooth-detected proximity information) in the dataset.
We choose to interpret each 5-min scan as a single period of a
DMACS system. One might argue that a longer time (e.g., 30
min) might be more reasonable for a single period t (e.g., for
collaboratively watching a video). However we are constrained
by the existing data. Our interpretation is reasonable if we
assume that the user pattern derived from the dataset is similar
to what would be observed in a DMACS system.
The groups in the dataset are “extremely dynamic and
sparse” [19], which suggests that at any time instant, a cluster
or a group is very unlikely to contain many users, and the
members of each group are changing very frequently. Indeed
we observe such patterns. For example, as shown in Figure
14, the data of October 2004 shows highly dynamic patterns
of the number of groups per period and the average number
of users per group per period. Most of the time, there is only
one or two groups in the system. Figure 15 further shows that
in that month, about 70% time, there are on average only 2 or
fewer users in a group (for which a trade is very unlikely
to happen). Thus, we should expect that M-CHAIN has a
low efficiency level in such a dynamic and sparse system.
Nevertheless, Figure 16 shows that M-CHAIN is still able to
maintain a reasonable efficiency level (around 20%).
V. RELATED WORK
Bredin et al. [7] proposes CHAIN, a design framework for
dynamic double auction, but it only considers a single market.
Nevertheless, the techniques in [7] give us some fundamental
building blocks for our proposed auction in this paper. A
pioneering work by Yang et al. [10] applies double auction
mechanism to assist k-anonymity location privacy service,
but [10] only studies single period and single-market auction
Fig. 14. Num. of users per group
and num. of groups in Oct. 2014.
Fig. 15. Empirical CDF of num. of
users per group in Oct. 2014.
Fig. 16. Efficiency of M-CHAIN in a highly dynamic and sparse system.
mechanisms. Auction-based incentive mechanisms are also
recently studied in [11], [12] for crowdsourcing to smart-
phones, but their models are not double auctions. Our work
also relies on some of the fundamental works on auction,
e.g., McAfee auction [9], Hajiaghayi’s online auction [8], and
the impossibility result from Myerson and Satterthwaite [16].
Examples of DMACS application include Microcast [1] and
mobile P2P based k-anonymity location privacy [4].
VI. CONCLUSION
We designed M-CHAIN, an auction-based incentive mech-
anism for the emerging user-assisted mobile crowd services,
referred to as DMACS. M-CHAIN is truthful and computa-
tionally efficient, and addresses the multi-market nature of a
DMACS system, which is absent from the existing dynamic
double auction designs. Our simulations based on generated
user patterns and real-world traces have demonstrated the good
efficiency level of M-CHAIN. As future work, we will fully
implement and test our design in a real mobile environment.
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APPENDIX
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Theorem 2 is re-stated below.
Virtual Market single-period matching rule is well-defined,
that is, it is truthful, no-deficit, individual-rational, and feasi-
ble.
Proof:
Virtual Market single-period matching rule is shown as
Algorithm 2.
We first prove that Virtual Market single-period matching
rule is truthful. To that end, we need to prove that both
reporting true group membership and reporting true value are
dominant strategies for a user ui.
Note that in Step 2 of Algorithm 2, the McAfee auction does
not take into consideration any group membership information.
Such information is considered in Step 3, the Group Matching
algorithm. In Step 3, reporting true group membership is a
dominant strategy for ui according to Lemma 2. Note that
this is also true for the heuristic (which is more efficient in
a dense and large graph than the Group Matching algorithm),
as discussed in Section III-A2.
Next we show that reporting true value (bid or ask) is a
dominant strategy for ui. We prove this for a buyer only.
Similarly we can prove it for a seller.
Consider buyer ubi . Her true value is bi, reported bid is bˆi.
We will show that there is no benefit for ubi to misreport her
bid in the following two cases.
Case 1. If bˆi = bi and ubi is chosen for trade by both Steps
2 and 3 of the Virtual Market rule (that is, ubi ∈ Bc and
ubi ∈ BW ), then there is no benefit to ubi if she misreports her
bid, that is, bˆi 6= bi. This in because in Step 2 of Algorithm
2, the McAfee auction ensures that the dominant strategy of a
user is to report her true bid. The fact that multiple overlapping
groups are pooled together as a single virtual group has no
impact on the truthfulness property of the McAfee auction as
it only takes values into consideration when determining who
will be the winners and the amount of payment for them. A
possible impact of the formation of the virtual group on ui is
that even if she reports her true value, she might not be selected
as one of the winners in this virtual group due to possibly the
addition of other buyers who are in different groups than ui
but with higher reported values than that of ui. Even in this
case, her dominant strategy is still to report her true value, as
otherwise she might not be even able to be selected as one
of winners in this more competitive environment. In addition,
Step 3 has no impact on her strategy, as this step only deals
with group membership.
Case 2. Suppose bˆi = bi and ubi is not chosen for trade
by the rule. Then there are only two possible reasons. First,
ubi cannot pass Step 2 of the algorithm. This step only uses
the vanilla McAfee algorithm, which only uses reported bids
and asks to select users for trade. Due to the truthfulness
property of McAfee, there is no benefit for ubi to cheat about
her bid in a possibly more competitive environment (see the
reasoning in Case 1). Second, ubi can pass Step 2, but cannot
pass Step 3. Since in Step 3, the algorithm only considers
users’ group membership information in selecting winning
users, thus, misreporting bids will not have any impact.
Secondly, Virtual Market rule is no-deficit or budget bal-
ance. In Step 2, it uses McAfee auction (see II-B2 and [9]), in
which the total amount of determined payments that will be
collected from buyers is always no less than the total amount
of determined payments that will be sent to sellers. In Step 3,
the Group Matching algorithm returns the exact same number
of buyers and sellers, and since the McAfee auction in Step
2 determines that all winning buyers pay the same amount of
payment to the auctioneer and all winning sellers receive the
same amount of payment from the auctioneer, thus, there is
no deficit.
Thirdly, Virtual Market rule is feasible, as the McAfee
auction in Step 2 returns an exact same number of winning
buyers as that of the winning sellers, and the Group Matching
algorithm in Step 3 guarantees that each final winning buyer
is always paired with one and only one final winning seller in
the same group, and vice versa.
Finally, Virtual Market rule is individual-rational, as the
payment sent by a final winning buyer to the auctioneer is
always no more than her true value, if she reports her true
value in the McAfee auction in Step 2. This is guaranteed
in a McAfee auction, see Section II-B2. Note that the Group
Matching in Step 3 has no impact on payment determination.
Thus, a final winning buyer should expect non-negative utility
if reporting true bid. Following a similar reasoning, Virtual
Market rule can also guarantee non-negative utility for a seller
if she reports her true ask. Recall the utility definition is given
in Section II-A2.
